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I.

Introduction

For more than five decades, economists and policy makers have observed and researched growing
disparities in job opportunities and earnings among working families and have proposed strategies to
improve job and earnings prospects for those at the bottom and middle of the earnings distribution. The
disparities also have a spatial dimension in that some states and regions of the United States grow, while
others lag, with corresponding job opportunities in growing and lagging regions. However, even within
states that enjoy relative prosperity, the gains from job creation occur disproportionately, as high-wage
jobs grow only in some areas of thriving states. There are growing earnings and job disparities among
states; among different areas within states; and between residents who work in high-wage occupations
and in less-skilled jobs within the thriving areas of states.
The paper first discusses growth disparities among regions of the United States and the reasons they have
widened in recent decades. It then turns to growth disparities within regions and MSAs. Federal and state
governments have addressed economic development in areas through place subsidies that utilize a variety
of tax forgiveness, as well as wage subsidies. Sections three through seven of the paper review the types
of subsidy policies directed at economic development of particular places and assesses their
effectiveness. Section eight addresses the empirical evidence on State Enterprise Zones (EZ), Federal
Employment Zones, and related programs.
The last two sections focus on job training and other policies that assist lower-skilled workers find
employment. Wage subsidies help low-skilled workers with job placement. These sections also discuss
preparing youth for future employment using ongoing research on income and social mobility through
improving conditions in neighborhoods for children as well as high-quality preschool education programs
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for children. People-based policies that build human capital in children need greater priority, and to the
extent possible, they need to be differentially directed toward children in distressed areas.

II.

Interregional Convergence and then Disparities

Rather than regional divergence, the economics and regional science literatures in the 1970s and 1980s
focused on the evident income convergence among states and regions, as predicted under conditions of
factor mobility by interregional trade models, and that are inspired by international trade theories. Barro,
as well as Barro and Sala-i-Martin, confirm income convergence at an annual rate of 1.8 percent among
states during the 1880 to 1980 period. 1 Carlino and Mills (1996) validate a convergence trend among
states into the 1990s, while noting a brief divergence from trend in the 1980s. 2 During these periods of
regional convergence within the U.S., less skilled workers migrated from low-wage regions to high-wage
regions. The population movement increased average wages in lower-than-national-average wage regions
and reduced average wages in higher-than-national-average wage regions. The interregional migrants
earned higher real incomes in their new regional locations. The movement of labor and population across
states and regions led to regional convergence in incomes and wages, as well as workers’ skills.
Even during the period of interregional convergence, some regions of the United States − Appalachia, for
example − lagged. In addition, economists and policymakers cautioned as early as the late 1950s and
early 1960s that regions with their employment concentrated in a few industries were subject to
downturns or longer-term stagnation, because they were vulnerable to economic forces that could change

Barro, Robert J. and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1991. “Convergence across States and Regions.” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity. Vol. 1: 107-182. Barro, R., & Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1992. Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 223251. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138606.
2 Carlino, Gerald and Leonard Mills. 1996. “Convergence and the U.S. States: A Time-Series Analysis.” Journal of Regional
Science. 36: 597-616.
1
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demand for their products and/or workers. 3 Such forces include adoption of substitute intermediate
goods that change demand for products – the use of more cement instead of steel in lower rise buildings.
For example, changes in production technologies (automation), or competition from other regions or
countries. A diverse regional economy less tied to a few industries or plants acted as insurance against a
national or regional decline in any particular industry.
Starting in the 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s and beyond, automation affected job growth, wages,
and regional convergence. Acemoglu and Restrepo, in a series of papers, show the effects of automation
on workers’ by their occupations, education levels, sex, and region of residence in the U.S. 4. They estimate
that automation has had its largest effects in automotive, plastics and chemicals, and metal product
industries, affecting about one-third of manufacturing employment and about 3 percent of total private
employment, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 5 Technological change has affected jobs
held by males more than females, especially males with education levels that range from less than high
school to some college, but no degree. On the other hand, job creation has occurred in higher wage jobs
in knowledge industries that require college degrees, as well as in low-wage service jobs.
Globalization, in the forms of offshoring and trade in goods and services, also affected jobs with its largest
effects in the first decade of the 21st century. Autor, Dorn, and Hansen examine the effects that

3 Chinitz, Benjamin. 1961."Contrasts in Agglomerations:

New York and Pittsburgh" American. Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings 2 (May): 279 – 289.
4 Acemoglu, Daron and Pascual Restrepo. “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from the U.S. Labor Market.” National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 23285, March, 2017. There are negative employment and wages effects on workers
in automobile manufacturing, electronics, metal products, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastic, food, glass and ceramics and
negative but smaller effects in construction, business services, wholesale, services and retail. A few sectors show modest gains
in employment, including finance, public sector, manufacturing areas that include recycling, basic metals, textiles, paper,
furniture, and transportation equipment other than automobiles. See also, Autor, David. 2010. “Polarization of Job Market
Opportunities in the U.S. Labor Market: Implications for Employment and Earnings.” Center for American Progress, The
Hamilton Project, an economics policy initiative of the Brookings Institution. https://economics.mit.edu/files/5554.
5 See https://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm
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competition from imports have had on the U.S. labor market, especially after 2000. 6 Autor, Dorn, and
Hansen succinctly summarize the effects of both automation and globalization on workers and jobs. 7
“Concurrent with the rapid growth of US imports from China, the effect of trade competition on the
manufacturing sector has become stronger over time, while the effects of technological change on
employment composition in the manufacturing sector has subsided.
Conversely, the impact of technology on jobs in the non-manufacturing sector is growing, as technological
change seems to be shifting from automation of production in manufacturing, to computerization of
(routine) information processing in knowledge-intensive industries.” (p 644) Given the above trends, the
composition of job growth can be expected to continue toward high-skill, high-wage jobs in nonmanufacturing sectors, as well as toward jobs in personal services that traditionally have had lower wages.
The growth in high-skill jobs has significant spatial/ regional implications. Skilled jobs in particular cluster
due to agglomeration economies, and have concentrated in areas along the west and east coasts of the
United States. 8 On the other hand, globalization and technological change have reduced job growth in the

6 Autor, David H. and David Dorn. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market.”

American Economic Review. 103 (5): 1553-97. Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hansen. 2013. “The China
Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review. 103(6):
2121-68.
7 Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hansen. 2015. “Untangling Trade and Technology: Evidence from Local Labor
Markets,” Economic Journal. 125(584): 621-646.
8 Marshall emphasized the importance of agglomeration economies, and Jane Jacobs called attention to knowledge spillovers
in urban areas. See Marshall, Alfred 1920. Principles of Economics. London MacMillan and Jacobs, Jane. 1969. The Economy
of Cities. New York Vintage. There is a large empirical literature that shows the productivity implications when manufacturing
firms cluster. See Rosenthal, Stuart S. and William C. Strange. 2001. “The Determinants of Agglomeration.” Journal of Urban
Economics. 50: 191-229. Rosenthal Stuart S. and William C. Strange. 2003. “Geography, Industrial Organization, and
Agglomeration.” The Review of Economics and Statistics. 50(2): 377-393. Glaeser and Mare place agglomeration in the
context of cities. See Glaeser, Edward and David C. Maré. 2001. “Cities and Skills.” Journal of Labor Economics, 19 (2): 316–
342. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/319563. Buzard et al. show the clustering of research and development
firms in chemical, electronics and other knowledge industries along the east and west coasts. See Buzard, Kristy, Gerald A
Carlino, Robert M. Hunt, Jake K. Carr and Tony E. Smith. 2017. “The Agglomeration of American R&D Labs.” Journal of Urban
Economics. 101: 14-26.
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regions between the two coasts, and has had especially large effects on jobs in the region that is east of the
Mississippi River and west of the Eastern corridor that runs from Boston to Washington, D.C. 9
Around the same time as technological change and globalization began to influence jobs and change
regional advantages, migration of low-wage workers declined, while high-wage workers in knowledge
industries continued to move to major cities. 10 Lin finds evidence that workers with more education adapt
more readily to “new work” or knowledge work in occupations that require adoption and use of newer
technologies. 11

III.

Regional Agglomeration, Productivity, and Migration Slowdown

Alfred Marshall theorized that industry agglomeration increased productivity, and Jane Jacobs added that
agglomeration of people in larger cities increased worker productivity through general knowledge
transfers among workers. A number of studies have verified that real wages are higher and continue to
increase in large cities and especially in knowledge-producing occupations. 12
While agglomeration economies increase productivity and wages among knowledge workers, zoning and
other building regulations in many cities have limited the supply elasticity of housing. Consequently, the
real prices of housing in knowledge cities and regions have increased, and knowledge workers’ wages have
outpaced the price of housing. As a result, knowledge workers’ welfare increases when they move to larger

Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st
Century America.” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/
10 Ganong, Peter and Daniel Shoag. 2017. “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?” Journal of Urban
Economics. 102: 76-90.
11 Lin Jeffrey. 2011. “Technological Adaptation, Cities and New Work.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 93(2):544-574.
12 Autor, David. Richard T. Ely Lecture, “Work of the Past, Work of the Future.” Richard T. Ely Lecture American Economic
Association: Papers and Proceeding, May 2019, 109(5), 1–32. https://www.aeaweb.org/webcasts/2019/aea-ely-lecturework-of-the-past-work-of-the-future or http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/dautor/video
9
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cities. On the other hand, the real wages of workers outside of the knowledge industries do not keep pace
with housing costs in knowledge cities.
Autor has recently demonstrated the above trends, showing that real wages of knowledge workers
increase when they move to large cities that have knowledge-based industries and that generally lie along
the east and west coasts of the United States. Further, he charts real wages of less-skilled workers against
city sizes in each of the years 1970, 1980, 2000, and 2015. Real wages of less-skilled workers increase
with city size in 1970, 1980, and 2000, although the real wage premium earned in larger cities versus
smaller cities shrinks over the period. By 2015, the real wage premium for less-skilled workers in larger
versus smaller cities has almost disappeared due to continued increases in housing costs in large cities.
Low-skilled workers no longer improve their real wages and welfare by migrating to larger and growing
cities once housing costs are taken into account. 13
Ganong and Shoag show in fact that migration of low-skilled workers has dramatically slowed down,
because their real wages do not increase when they move to knowledge-based cities. As a result, income
convergence among regions has ceased. Further, they show that places with more restrictive land use
regulations have had the largest increase in housing prices and the slowest in-migration rates among
workers not in knowledge-based industries. 14
Their specific empirical evidence reveals that intercountry migration (number of movers divided by
county population) that stood at 7 percent in 1950, declined gradually to 6 percent into the early 2000s.

13 Autor, David. Ibid.

Ganong, Peter and Daniel Shoag. 2017. “Why Has Regional Income Convergence in the U.S. Declined?” Journal of Urban
Economics. 102: 76-90. They note that places with less restrictive zoning continue to exhibit income convergence with other
places.
14
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After 2008, inter-county migration rates declined more quickly and reached 3.7 percent in 2015. Intracounty migration rates experienced a similar slowdown, declining steadily from 13 percent in 1950 to
about 10 percent in mid 1990s, and decreasing to 7 percent by 2015. With little reason to migrate, less
skilled workers have remained in places that suffer job losses from technology and globalization forces,
while high skilled workers have moved to, and have concentrated in, knowledge-based and growing
areas. 15

IV.

Intraregional Disparities within Thriving Regions

Coastal regions have benefited from the growth acceleration in knowledge industries – finance; other
business services; electronics; chemicals, including pharmaceuticals; measuring, analyzing, and control
devices; among a few others. 16 While these regions and their mega-cities thrive overall, they have
substantial numbers of residents who do not participate in the high wage jobs. Autor’s findings on wage
polarization patterns is particularly evident in thriving cities and regions, where substantial percentages of
people work, and yet, live at or near poverty income levels. In New York City, for example, the five-county
poverty rate stands at 14.2 percent of households, but poverty rates in three of the five counties that
comprise New York City stand at 28.6 percent in Bronx, 20.6 percent in Kings (Brooklyn), and 17.2

Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st
Century America.” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.
https://www.brookings.edu/bpea-articles/saving-the-heartland-place-based-policies-in-21st-century-america/ A report
from McKinsey Global Institute presents updated migration figures with no change in trend. McKinsey Global Institute. 2019.
“The Future of Work in America: People and Places, Today and Tomorrow.”
16 Buzard, Kristy, Gerald A Carlino, Robert M. Hunt, Jake K. Carr and Tony E. Smith. 2017. “The Agglomeration of American
R&D Labs.” Journal of Urban Economics. 101: 14-26.
15
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percent in Manhattan. 17 Moreover, children living in households that are below or barely above poverty
levels have lower probabilities for income and social mobility. 18
Governments have enacted policies to address poverty, educational opportunities, and jobs for lowincome households in cities for 50 or more years. Some programs direct benefits to individuals and
households. A number of other programs attempt to support economic activity in specific places through
subsidies to housing, businesses, or other entries located within particular areas. These place subsidy
programs attempt to improve economic conditions in specially designated locales, and thereby attempt
to improve economic outcomes for individuals who reside in these places.

V.

Pros and cons of Place Subsidies

Economists have generally argued against place-based subsidies that direct funds to businesses and/or
infrastructure, and instead favor allocating aid directly to people. A principal objection to place-based
subsidies is that place subsidies direct funds to less productive or lagging regions, thereby reinforcing
inefficient location patterns and reducing national income. Put another way, the same money spent in
growing areas could produce greater productivity, more employment, and higher national income. 19
Nonetheless, various policies have directed place subsidies to both large regional areas and small areas
within regions. In the latter case, the subsidies direct funds to areas within central cities that have few
employers, low employment participation, and /or high unemployment among their residents.

17 Data on poverty from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Small Area Income and Poverty Program Estimates.
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html
18 Chetty, Raj, David Grusky, Maximilian Hell, Nathaniel Hendren, Robert Manduca, and Jimmy Narang. “The Fading American
Dream: Trends in Income Mobility since 1940.” Science 28 Apr 2017: Vol. 356, Issue 6336, pp. 398-406 DOI:
10.1126/science.aal4617
19 A classic reference is Noll, Roger G. and Andrew Zimbalist. 1997. Sports, Jobs and Taxes. Washington, D.C. The Brookings
Institution.
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On the other hand, place subsidies could induce greater area economic efficiency if they compensate for
negative externalities and or increase productivity by inducing agglomeration economies. Kahn (2012)
has advanced an equity rationale to justify place subsidies. 20 He notes that differences in development
levels among regions can become untenable based on cultural or national norms, and policy makers use
place subsidies with the intention of boosting development in places, even if there are higher returns for
alternative uses of the funds.
For large regions, governments have supported infrastructure investments – canals, railroads, highways,
for example – that undergird regional development efforts. Other programs attempt to foster
development in smaller distressed areas within cities using subsidies to industries, typically through tax
forgiveness programs. However, the rationales behind particular place-subsidy programs are often
elusive. Specifically, the intended beneficiaries by income group or other socio-economic characteristics
are vague, and because intended beneficiaries and outcomes lack clear definition, the programs’
effectiveness are difficult to measure.
Justifying place subsidies at an abstract level begs questions about the effectiveness of place subsidies in
providing local employment, the amount of investment it might take to have measurable effects on
economic outcomes, the benefits and costs of the investments in the local areas, as well as whether the
outcomes increase national output. Nonetheless, Kahn has identified equity grounds as a key reason that
policy makers fund place subsidies, and for that reason, place subsidies policies in one form or another are
likely to continue.

20 Kahn, Mathew E. 2012. “Cities, Economic Development, and the Role of Place-Based Policies: Prospects for Appalachia.” In

Appalachian Legacy: Economic Opportunity After the War on Poverty. James P. Ziliak (Editor). Washington D.C. Brookings
Institution Press: 149-168.
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VI.

Place Subsidy Programs Across Large Regions

Place subsidies range from regionally based programs that target large areas that cross many states to
those that target small areas in cities in attempts to boost employment among workers who live in specific
places. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the President’s (Johnson) Appalachia Regional
Commission (PARC) represent two large regionally based federal government efforts to foster
development. States and/or private investments in cities and regions are additional examples of regional
development strategies.
States and local governments have generally attempted to stimulate development in smaller depressed
areas of cities. They use state and local tax incentives directed at businesses and sometimes combine them
with grants in aid directed at specific city areas that are designated as enterprise zones or similar names.
The federal government recently introduced Federal Empowerment Zones (FEZ) that also target small,
depressed areas within cities. Business in these zones receive wage subsidies and tax incentives or tax
forgiveness.
Figure 1 provides a list of place subsidies along with their key features. Studies that evaluate regional and
city area place subsidies are discuss below. Where research findings allow, programs’ effectiveness are
reported.
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VII.

Figure 1
Taxonomy of Place Subsidies
Large Federal, State or Private
Investments
Programs

Focus Areas

Sources of Funds

Tax
Incentives

Successful

TVA

Large regional
area

Federal

No

Yes

PARC
(Appalachia)

Large number of
county areas in
13 different
states

Federal with input from states
and localities

No

Somewhat

State, local, private

Includes
local tax
incentives
but they
do not
drive the
program

Yes
Employment
gains occur
largely in
higher-wage
industries and
occupations

Private funds. State location of
MSU medical school in GR

Not a
main
feature of
the
program

Yes

State of NY and Private
investment

Yes. Not
a main
feature of
the
program.

Yes

Ben Franklin
TechnologyBased
Economic
Partnership

Grand Rapids,
MI (GR)

Albany, NY

Four large
regions covering
State of PA

Grand Rapids
region

Nanotechnology
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Taxonomy of Place Subsidies (Continued)
Place Subsidies for Low-Income Areas of Cities
State Enterprise Zones
Programs

Focus Areas

Sources of Funds

Tax
Incentives

Successful

State
Enterprise
Zones (EZ)

40 states
introduced
EZs by
2008. State
and local
governments
offer
subsidies to
businesses
that locate in
distressed
areas of
cities.

Subsidies vary by state and include
tax credits against state income
taxes based on wages of employees;
tax credits for capital investment;
and property tax forgiveness. Some
states also reduce regulations and
improve city infrastructure

Yes. Most
of the
programs
offer only
tax
subsidies

Evidence is
mixed. States
have moved
away from EZ
strategies.

12

Taxonomy of Place Subsidies (Continued)
Federal Zones
Programs

Federal
Empowerment
Zones (FEZ)

Focus Areas

Small Areas (10
sq. miles) of
eight different
cities

Sources of Funds

Federal employerwage tax credit.
$100 million block
grant for business
assistance, training,
youth services,
housing assistance.

Tax Incentives

Successful

Yes. Employers
receive a 20%
wage subsidy on
the first $15,000
of earnings for
employees who
live and work in
the FEZ.
Higher
percentage for
179 capital
expensing
allowance.

Mixed evidence of
success.

Partial exclusion
of capital gains on
investments in
FEZs.
Federal
Enterprise
Communities
(FEC)

Opportunity
Zones (OZ)

66 areas of cities
that applied for
but not awarded
FEZs
Provision of Tax
Cut Job Act
2017 (TCJA).
Many zones
designated. Not
restricted to the
lowest income
areas.

No block grant and
less generous wage
subsidies than FEZs.
Forgive investors’
capital gains taxes
when gains invested
in OZs for ten years
or more.

Source: Various publications and author summaries.
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Yes. Employers
receive wage
subsidies.

Evidence of success.

Yes. Potentially
forgives all capital
gains.

Too recently
implemented to
have empirical
evidence on
effectiveness.

VIII.

Large Federal Regional Development Programs: TVA and PARC

Klein and Moretti, Widner, and Ziliak in three separate studies have evaluated the economic effects of
two large place subsidies, The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the President’s Appalachian
Regional Commission (PARC). TVA started in 1933 and continued until 1960. TVA subsidies largely
supported electricity-generating dams, flood control systems, and navigable canals. A small portion of
funds went to malaria control, educational programs, and health clinics. 21 The scale of investment at its
peak amounted annually to $750 per household in the region or about 10 percent of annual income for a
typical household. 22 Klein and Moretti found the direct effects of the investment increased regional
manufacturing productivity by 8.7 percent and increased household incomes in the TVA region. When
they also accounted for the agglomeration effects that TVA induced, TVA generated net benefits to the
region as well as raised the productivity of manufacturing in the nation overall by 0.4 percent.
Even with their positive results, Klein and Moretti caution that TVA investment may not uniquely affect
national growth. Similar investment elsewhere may have contributed more than 0.4 percent to the
nation’s growth in manufacturing, for example. Moreover, they note that the positive results may be
specific to a time when manufacturing enjoyed robust growth in the U.S. They suggest that their results
may not scale to other regions nor apply in a new economy that relies on high-tech clusters and an
educated workforce for job creation. 23

21 Moretti, Enrico. 2012. The New Geography of Jobs.

New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt. pg. 200.
Kline, Patrick and Enrico Moretti. 2014. “Local Economic Development, Agglomeration Economies and the Big Push: 100
Years of Evidence from the Tennessee Valley Authority.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 129 (1): 275-331.
23 Crisuolo et al. report employment effects of United Kingdom industrial policy between 1997 and 2004. The policy targeted
high unemployment regions and subsidized capital in manufacturing firms located in the targeted regions. Whether a subsidy
to capital will create jobs depends on the output effects that the subsidy creates as well as the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor because the subsidy reduces the cost of capital relative to labor. They find that a 10 percent decrease in the
price of capital increases jobs by 10 percent in small manufacturing enterprises (fewer than 50 employees), and no employment
effects for larger manufacturing enterprises. They also found no increase in total factor productivity. See Criscuolo, Chiara,
22
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The President’s Appalachian Regional Commission (PARC) started in 1965 as a long-term economic
improvement program for a large swath of countries located in 13 different states – a region that spans a
larger geographic area than the TVA. Widner evaluated the program after 25 years of operation and Ziliak
updated Widner’s work. 24 Widner notes that PARC has three main functions. It serves as a forum for
ideas about economic development. Each state, however, formulates a specific development strategy and
proposes its own projects in line with its development strategy. PARC serves as a coordinating body to
foster collaboration on projects among states in the region.
Both Widner and Ziliak acknowledge that counties lying in Northern, Southern, and Central portions of
Appalachia have different potentials for development. Poverty rates also differ significantly among the
three areas; residents of Central counties were worse off overall than Northern and Southern Appalachian
counties’ residents.
PARC’s major development theme centered on leveraging existing regional growth poles or taking
advantage of the economic strengths in the cities and regions adjacent to Appalachian counties. Another
focus was creating job opportunities in industries unrelated to coal to diversify the economy, help job
growth, and improve prospects for long-term development. At the same time, some areas had few public
services – local education, health, police, fire, hospitals, or streets. Limited amounts of federal, state, and
local dollars were invested in public services and human capital/development. The bulk of the PARC
money went to extending interstate highways to facilitate traffic flow through the region. The aim here is

Ralf Martin, Henry G. Overman, and John Van Reenen. 2019. "Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy." American
Economic Review, 109 (1): 48-85.
24 Widner, Ralph R. 1990. “Appalachian Development after 25 Years: An Assessment.” Economic Development Quarterly.
4(4) (November): 291-312. Ziliak, James P. 2012 “The Appalachian Regional Development Act and Economic Change.”
Appalachian Legacy: Economic Opportunity after the War on Poverty.” Ed. James P. Ziliak. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press.
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to ease transportation in and out of the Appalachian region that would in turn entice branch plant startups from industries located in major cities (growth poles) bordering Appalachian counties. The new
highways would also provide opportunities for residents to commute to jobs in other areas.
Widner finds that during PARC’s first 25 years, southern Appalachian counties that border medium-sized
metropolitan areas exhibited higher growth than counties in other areas of Appalachia. He notes that
during the same period, however, the southern region of the country in general experienced greater
growth than other areas of the country, and the higher overall growth of the U.S. southern region
contributed in part to southern Appalachia’s success relative to other areas of Appalachia. Nonetheless,
Widener concludes that the PARC development strategies played a significant role.
In addition, PARC provided additional vocational training for residents of Appalachia. While the regional
economy has not absorbed many of these trained workers and many leave the area, Widner suggests that
the region made progress on many fronts, including health, education, and housing for residents. He notes
in conclusion that the quality of the work force will determine future local economic development.
Populations in Appalachia have educational gaps when compared to populations outside Appalachia. The
educational gaps, he suggests, are similar to those between many low-income neighborhoods within cities
and their more affluent intraregional neighbors.
Ziliak applies econometric analysis to estimate the effects that PARC’s investments have had on poverty
rates and per capita income growth in Appalachia between 1960 and 2000. Poverty rates fell in southern
and central Appalachian counties. However, relative to poverty rates in other rural counties in America,
they increased in northern counties. He also finds that infrastructure and transportation investments
reduced poverty much more than the human development subsidies.
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Per capita income grew faster during the 1960 to 2000 period in Appalachia than in other rural counties
in America. Per capita income growth was uneven among Appalachian counties, however. Those
Appalachian counties adjacent to urban areas that lie just outside of Appalachia had slower per capita
income growth rates than counties that lie outside of Appalachia and are adjacent to the same urban
areas. 25 Ziliak concludes that more investment is needed in the region, as well as a better understanding
of the contributions various components of PARC make to poverty reduction and per capita income
growth.

VIII-1. Large Scale Place Investments by States and Private Investors
States, private investors, and local governments have undertaken other targeted investments in efforts to
turn around regional economies. Three major initiatives include areas that cover the State of Pennsylvania;
Grand Rapids, Michigan; and Albany, New York. All attempt to recharge lagging regional economies. Each
utilizes a different financial approach.
The State of Pennsylvania, concerned about its fading industrial base, launched the Ben Franklin
Technology-Based Economic Partnership (BFTP) in 1983. It divided the state into four regions –
Pittsburgh and the western portion of the State, the Philadelphia area, University Park in the central swath
of the State, and Lehigh Valley – former home of Bethlehem Steel – that lies in the eastern third of the state
and north of the Philadelphia area.

Ziliak notes that one previous study compared income growth in Appalachia to income growth in other rural counties in
America and found income grew faster in Appalachia, while a second study compared income growth in Appalachia to income
growth in counties bordering Appalachia and found income grew more slowly in Appalachia. Ziliak’s findings are consistent
with the findings of the other two studies that used the two different comparison groups of counties. See Isserman, Andrew
and Terance Rephann. 1995. “The Effects of the Appalachian Regional Commission.” Journal of the American Planning
Association. 61(3):345-365, and Glaeser, Edward, and Joshua Gottlieb. 2008. “The Economics of Place Making Policies.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1 (Spring):155-253.
25

17

The State of Pennsylvania invested funds that it received from a 1998 tobacco settlement into regional
life sciences initiatives, which amounts to $64 million per year for the ensuing 25 years. 26 In 2002,
Pennsylvania also funded a Greenhouse Life Sciences initiative, and invested $100 million in three
locations, Pittsburgh, Central PA, and Southeastern PA, to support public/private partnerships
(government, businesses, universities, and other partners). Because each of the four regions had different
initial strengths in technology-based industries and life sciences, each would leverage the investment
funds differently. As a result, the organizations formed, the types of jobs created, and the populations that
benefit from the BFTP program differ among Pennsylvania’s four regions.
For example, Lehigh Valley established the Lehigh Valley Development Committee (LVDC), comprised
of leaders from business, government, financial, and university to guide development in the region. The
LVDC organization has a paid staff and is funded from a newly instituted local hotel tax. The LVDC plan
aimed to establish an advanced manufacturing cluster in life sciences, build high-value business services,
and capitalize on its extant food and beverage processing industry. It also promoted life sciences research,
entrepreneurship, and the establishment of new companies.
To overcome the lack of venture capital in the region – a recurring issue in lagging cities and regions − the
LVDC organized 16 area regional banks to provide startup loans to new companies. LVDC also recruited
new U.S. and international establishments. The region also benefits from its population size, a technology
oriented university in its center, and its proximity to the pharmaceutical and technology corridor that runs

26 Act 77 State of Pennsylvania

https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2001&sessInd=0&act=77
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from Boston to Washington D.C. 27 The region has built an advanced manufacturing base around medical
activities and other industries, which provides employment for its residents.
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have had significant life sciences in their universities and hospitals located in
their respective regions. Pittsburgh, for example, continued to develop its medical center at The University
of Pittsburgh, which is currently the largest employer in Pittsburgh followed by the University of
Pittsburgh itself. Pittsburgh also remains a major center for financial activities. Capitalizing on the
strengths of Carnegie-Mellon University, the Pittsburgh economy has also had job growth in robotics,
advanced manufacturing, and autonomous systems. High-wage and highly educated persons in these
fields thrive in Pittsburgh. The region has also retained major firms and attracted others − Alcoa, Bayer,
Google, and Uber. In addition, the region has developed a diversified energy production system. It exports
energy produced from coal, natural gas, nuclear, solar, and wind power – industries where workers require
advanced skills but do not require advanced degrees.
A drawback is that the region does not yet have the level of entrepreneurship to convert the innovations
from research and development at its universities to downstream manufacturing and service jobs. The
high-tech transformation also has not created jobs for disadvantaged workers. Pittsburgh city’s poverty
rate stands at 23 percent. 28

27 Lehigh Valley Economic Council Annual Report 2017 “Come Here, Start here, Grow Here.” https://lehighvalley.org/wp-

content/uploads/2018/03/LVEDC-2017-Annual-Report.pdf
28 Andes, Scott, Mitch Horowitz, Ryan Helwig, and Bruce Katz. “Capturing the next economy: Pittsburgh's rise as a global
innovation city.” Brookings Institution. September 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/pittsburgh_full.pdf Similar results apply to the Philadelphia area.
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Grand Rapids, MI 29
Grand Rapids City has 199,000 residents and its MSA has with 1.0 million residents. The region has three
major employment areas − Grand Rapids City being one of the three. The region’s manufacturing sector,
especially fabricated metals, was tied to the automobile industry, and its leading industry began to struggle
as early as the 1980s, and declined rapidly between 2000 and 2005.
Grand Rapids City business leaders anticipated the decline in Michigan’s automobile industries and
foresaw a need for new development. In 1991, a Grand Vision Committee formed which later became a
Grand Action Committee for Grand Rapids City. Several business leaders in Grand Rapids City owned
closely held, locally based companies, including Amway, Steelcase Office Furniture, and Meijer Food.
They provided the main impetus for implementing development plans. (The other two employment
centers in the Grand Rapids region created their own development councils.)
The leaders invested private funds, derived from their personal donations and from their foundations, in
parks, convention centers, and other community infrastructure in Grand Rapids downtown and areas near
downtown. For example, Van Andel of Amway bought a downtown hotel and created the Amway Grand
Plaza in an area around the renovated hotel. The DeVos Family used its funds to establish a downtown
campus of Grand Valley State University.
To diversify the employment base, the group established the Medical Mile in downtown Grand Rapids.
Van Andel invested $1 billion to establish the Andel Research Institute for biomedical research that
opened in 2000. The Grand Action Committee raised $20 million to match a Michigan State alumnus’ gift

29 A Brookings report examines turnarounds in a number of locations and reports extensively on Grand Rapids. Atkins, Patricia,

Pamela Blumenthal, Adrienne Edisis, Alex Friedhoff, Leah Curran, Lisa Lowry, Travis St. Clair, Howard Wial, and Harold
Wolman. “Responding to Manufacturing Job Loss: What Can Economic Development Policy Do?” Metropolitan Policy
Program at Brookings Institution. June 2011.
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to lure relocation of a significant portion of Michigan State University’s College of Human Medicine to
Grand Rapids. Spurred by the presence of the medical school and Andel Research Institute, Spectrum
Health located to Grand Rapids City, and several manufacturing companies changed their operations to
fabricate medical devices and other orthopedic products.
Except for the location of a major portion of Michigan State’s College of Human Medicine, the Grand
Rapids transformation occurred largely without state intervention or funding. Nonetheless, despite the
large investments and high multipliers associated with high-wage employees in advanced manufacturing
and medical facilities, the region’s revitalization has not benefited all residents. The poverty rate among
residents of Grand Rapids City hovers at 25 percent and stands at 11.6 percent in the MSA.

Albany, NY 30
Albany, being a capital city, has a large state government work force. The area also houses a large public
university (SUNY Albany), a leading engineering school (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute), and IBM
operated a large facility located between NYC and Albany. Nonetheless, the Albany area began to
experience economic decline in the 1970s and 1980s. In the mid-1980s, Governor Mario Cuomo led
efforts to attract nanotechnology to the region. Regional leaders also established the Center for Economic
Growth in 1987, funded with donations from large private companies, banks, trade unions, and
universities. In 1988, the Governor funded a graduate research initiative on advanced semiconductors at
SUNY Albany. Before he left office in 1994, he enhanced SUNY Albany’s strength in the sciences by
funding new faculty hires and investments in research labs.

30 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK158826/#ch7.s1
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With the large NYS commitment to semiconductors, SEMATECH - a non-profit organization of semiconductor manufacturers that perform research − relocated from Austin, Texas to Albany, NY, followed
by Tokyo Electronics. In 2004, NYS, SEMATECH, and IBM contributed a total of about $500 million to
establish a College of Nanotechnology at SUNY Albany. 31 Tokyo Electronics contributed $200 million
to the SUNY Albany Center for Excellence.
The public-private investments attracted additional nanotechnology-manufacturing companies to the
area to take advantage of knowledge spillovers/agglomeration economies associated with the
innovations in nanotechnology occurring in the area. NYS continues to subsidize nanotechnology
relocations in the area, including $1.2 billion in incentives to Global Foundries to build a semiconductor
factory in Malta – a suburb located 20 miles north of Albany. In addition, Hudson Valley Community
College offers a 25-credit nanotechnology certificate to train students for entry-level positions in
nanotechnology manufacturing.
While nanotechnology is highly competitive globally, NYS has certain advantages, such as its stable
geology necessary for chip manufacturing and a cluster of research and major manufacturing facilities.
Semiconductor technology also has applications in biological areas, such as synthetic biology, human body
implants, and biometric monitoring. Expansion to more areas could further diversify the production lines
and make the region less vulnerable to downturns in a single specialized industry.

31 NYS invested $210 million; SEMATECH $40 million plus $120 million in kind; IBM $100 million.
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VIII-2. Lessons from Large-Scale Place Subsidies as Development Policies
The foregoing big investment strategies have had success in growing regional economies, and in the latter
three cases, transforming the regions from traditional manufacturing based economies to ones more
concentrated in high-tech and advanced manufacturing. Part of their successes may also be attributable
to their region-wide emphases, (as opposed to focusing on a small area of a city) to their extant skilled
work forces, and to population sizes of a million of more residents.

The turnarounds have other common elements worth noting:
1. The strategies require large investments, typically sustained over decades. For example, to
increase a region’s GDP by 20 percent may require an investment of 200 percent of the region’s
GDP, assuming a 10 percent rate of return on investment. The financial investment and support
has occurred for 20 or more years. Given the amount of investment needed, this strategy may not
easily scale to more than one area of a state.
2. Larger regions have exhibited the most growth potential because these areas generally have
human capital, universities, agglomeration economies, and cultural amenities, all of which regional
strategies can leverage for higher returns on investment.
3. Albany, Grand Rapids, and Pennsylvania have invested in growth industries that involve
engineering, advanced manufacturing, life sciences, universities, or medical facilities, and often
two or three from the above list. They have targeted relatively high-wage, export-based activities
that have high multipliers for local service jobs. Either through community colleges or other
curricula, the regions have invested in educating and sustaining skilled workforces.
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4. Regions have implemented training customized to the local employers’ demand for workers who
prepare themselves to work in better-paying technical positions in healthcare, information
systems and other advanced manufacturing areas. 32 Training curricula require input from local
employers who will hire trained individuals. 33
5. Successful places have formed organizations of leaders from business, government, universities,
financial institutions, and other local organizations who invest financially in and commit personal
service to the area. 34 Regional financial institutions with appropriate government partnership can
provide needed venture capital in areas that traditional venture capitalists avoid.
6. Poverty persists in these regions, and growth in high-skilled jobs does not necessarily lead to
employment of low-income residents and reduce poverty. Parallel programs of direct wage
subsidies, and Earned Income Tax Credits are needed to employ lower-skilled workers.
Investment in high-quality local education will prepare the youth in the region for future jobs.

IX.

Place Studies Targeted at Particular Companies or Locations.

Federal, state, and local governments have enacted a number of initiatives to attract employers to lowincome areas of cities. In special cases, state and localities have engaged in megadeals – generous tax
forgiveness programs and provisions for new infrastructure – to attract major employers. Businesses

32 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical

Report No. 18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Page 99.
https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-035
33 Studies show that employer-based job training programs can have had success, but employers have limited incentive to train
workers when the skill transfer easily to other jobs outside the company or region. See Heckman, James J. 1999. “Doing it Right:
Job Training and Education,” The Public Interest, 135, Spring: 91-107. Employer incentives increase when workers accept
lower wages during the training period. Job training offered in community colleges when customized to regional demand for
employment using input from local employers has proven more effectives. See evaluation of Project Quest program in San
Antonio, Texas.. https://www.questsa.org/skills-training/ And Schwartz, Nelson D. 2019. “Job Training is a Shot at Prosperity
for Texans.” NY Times. August 20. B1 and B4.
34 Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. Op.cit.
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typically drive the megadeals and choose their locations. Megadeals do not necessarily target specific
locations in lagging areas within cities or lagging regional economies.

IX-1. Megadeals
Megadeals are by their nature sui generis in that they occur episodically; the subsidized plant/industry
ranges from large manufacturing to major retailing; and the new plant generally chooses among generous
offers from a number of states and localities. Government enticements generally include tax forgiveness,
public expenditures on new infrastructure that supports the business, and/or workforce training. 35
Recent examples include large automobile manufacturing plants – BMW, Mercedes, Nissan −, and more
recently, Hon Hai Precision Industry (FOXCONN), as well as a non-manufacturing location (Amazon).
Economists and policy makers generally regard these subsidies as necessities, because local and state
leaders want to win locations of large firms that promise large numbers of new jobs in a locality and state.
However, analysts generally reason that the wages and job benefits the firms bring do not warrant the
mega subsidies they receive from states and localities. In addition, the deals induce firms to choose
locations based on fiscal incentives rather than the inherent productivity at various locations. As such, a
firm’s ultimate choice of a location may misalign with maximization of national productivity and output.
On the other hand, firms may take advantage of the subsidies and locate in a place they would have chosen
based on productivity considerations alone. In that case, the location optimizes national productivity.
However, the tax revenues forgone in the megadeal introduce opportunity costs associated with tax

Mattera, Philip, Kasia Tarczynska with Greg LeRoy. “Megadeals: The Largest Economic Development Subsidy Packages
Ever Awarded by State and Local Governments in the United States.” June 2013 data updated to 2018
https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals. Firms that receive mega-deals sometimes make payment in lieu of taxes that may
support public investments that benefit the firm or support local public expenditures.
35
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reductions that extant businesses and people could have enjoyed had the tax concessions not occurred.
With tax reductions, people could have had more funds to spend on private goods and/or chosen more
local public goods.
Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010) identify another channel through which a new large plant
location might warrant large state or local subsidies or tax forgiveness (megadeals). In their empirical
analysis, they find that extant plants in an area experience productivity gains when a new very large plant
locates in their region. Larger gains accrue to extant plants that share labor pools with and use similar
technologies to the newly located plant. 36 They do not measure the size of the productivity gains and
therefore do not compare the productivity gains to the cost of the subsidies. The main point of their paper
is that such external economies exist.
Not all megadeals produce sizeable or even positive external benefits – megadeals for large malls, for
example. The opportunistic and episodic nature of mega deals make them unreliable as economic
development strategies. Nonetheless, these “deals” may payoff locally when the new company produces
export-based outputs, when deals draw investment and jobs to a region that otherwise would not have
occurred, or yield agglomeration/productivity benefits to extant firms in the region.
Overall, megadeals appear woven into state and local responses to location overtures of large
firms/projects. State and localities should evaluate carefully the direct, indirect, and spillover productivity
benefits of the large firm in determining the extent of tax subsidies. Ultimately, the deals may not drive

Greenstone, Michael, Richard Hornbeck, and Enrico Moretti. 2010. “Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from
Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings.” Journal of Political Economy. 118 (3): 536 -598.
36
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location choice, and instead provide economic rents. Or, if they do drive location choice, they, from a
national perspective, may induce inefficient location choices.

IX-2. Place Subsidies in Declining Areas of Cities.
Despite economists’ reservations about the efficacy of place subsidies, governments have long used place
subsidies in many forms. For example, public housing programs began in the 1930s in Atlanta, and in the
1950s and ensuing decades, public housing, urban renewal, model cities, and other programs aimed to
redevelop central cities. Government place subsidies have evolved to tax breaks and other types of
subsides available when employers locate in particular areas of cities or regions. The rationale behind place
subsidies is to generate economic activity in selected areas to improve employment prospects of
disadvantaged workers who reside in the areas.
Spatial mismatch has shaped some thinking about place subsidies. In the 1960s, John Kain found evidence
of spatial mismatch or that employment opportunities declined for central city workers, especially for
black, male (the language of that time) workers, as jobs decentralized from central cities to adjacent
suburbs. He concluded that segregation patterns in housing isolated African Americans from jobs that
were leaving the city and moving to suburban locations. Both access to information about the locations
of job openings as well as the added cost of commuting from the city to suburban job locations reduced
employment for African Americans residing in cities. 37

37 Kain, John F. 1968. “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization. The Quarterly Journal of

Economics. 82(2): 175-197. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885893. See also Kain, John F. 1992. “The Spatial
Mismatch Hypothesis: Three Decades Later.” Housing Policy Debate. 3(2): 371-462. The research spawned a number of
papers on housing values in central cities, with some research finding housing values lower in areas with concentrated number
of African-American residents that might compensate for longer commutes to suburban jobs. Follain, Jr. James R, and Stephen
Malpezzi. 1981. “Another Look at Racial Differences in Housing Prices.” Urban Studies. 18: 195-203.
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Kain and Persky argued against what they termed “ghetto gilding”; that is, place subsidies that provide
jobs and other improvements in cities, because they ultimately reinforce existing economically inefficient
residential patterns within cities. 38 Instead, they advocated for a first-best approach that would open up
housing opportunities for African Americans at suburban locations. More specifically, they recommended
addressing discrimination against African-Americans in housing at suburban locations, including
discriminatory practices in building, zoning, and lending. With access to housing outside central cities
areas, African Americans could live closer to jobs and have better access to employment.
Ellwood, Ihlandfeldt and others in different papers began to question spatial mismatch and Kain’s initial
findings. 39 Their work did not lead them to support place subsidies, however. More recently, Hellerstein,
Neumark and McInerny have also challenged aspects of spatial mismatch. 40 While acknowledging that
spatial mismatch plays a role in joblessness among African American workers in cities, their study finds
that the location of employers who hire African American workers is more important than spatial
mismatch per se.
More precisely, employers located in central city areas that are nearer African-American residential areas
tend to hire white workers for all types of jobs. In contrast, central city employers who hire AfricanAmerican workers tend to locate farther away from African American residential areas. As a result, African
Americans work farther away from their residences than other races. Because of the above hiring patterns,

38 Kain, John F. and Joseph J. Persky. 1969. “Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto.” The Public Interest. 14: 74-91.

Ellwood, David. 1986. “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are There Teenage Jobs Missing in the Ghetto?” In The Black
Youth Employment Crisis. Edited by Richard B. Freeman and Harry J. Holzer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pp 147187. Ihlandfeldt, Keith. 1994. “The Spatial Mismatch between Jobs and Residential Locations Within Urban Areas,” Cityscape:
A Journal of Policy Development and Research. 1(1): 219-243.
40 Hellerstein, Judith K. David Neumark and Melissa McInerney. 2007. “Spatial Mismatch or Racial Mismatch?” NBER Working
Paper Series. Working Paper 13161 http://nber.org.papers/w13161
39
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Hellerstein et al. suggest that placed-based policies motivated by the need to address spatial mismatch or
bring jobs to specific areas of cities may not increase employment among African Americans or other
groups, and may not address poverty reduction to the extent that the policy makers anticipate.
Overall, the above literature questions whether programs that aim to attract new employers to depressed
areas or foster business already in the area to expand and reduce unemployment in the depressed area.
Even if the subsidies do create new jobs, they may not employ workers who live in the depressed area. I
turn to a review of federal, state, and local programs that use tax and other incentives to create jobs.

X.

Tax Incentives as Tools for Development of Distressed Areas

Fueled by thinking on supply-side economics, states created enterprise zones as early as the 1980s to
attract manufacturing enterprises to distressed economic zones of cities to increase the number of jobs
and wages in these areas. A reading of the empirical findings suggests more tax incentive programs have
failed to deliver job creation than have succeeded. Among the reasons is that new jobs in zone areas may
displace jobs in other areas of the city when businesses relocate from outside the zone to inside the zone.
Analysts therefore have observed that counting the total number of new jobs in an enterprise zone may
overstate the total number of jobs created. A related question is whether the jobs created benefit the zone
residents, as the EZ program intends. 41 Enterprise zone program evaluation should also account for the
types of jobs created (ex. full or part-time), the duration of the jobs, and the level of wages.
Capitalization of the program benefits into land prices, housing prices, and housing rents represent an
unintended effect of enterprise zone policies. Capitalization can occur when a program successfully

Peters, Alan H., and Peter S. Fisher. 2002. State Enterprise Zone Programs: Have They Worked? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/9781417524433
41
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attracts firms and/or households to the targeted area. Residents may find their housing prices and rents
increase in the area. Current homeowners gain, while renters who experience higher rents and who are
employed prior to the enterprise zone program may see their real incomes decline. The capitalization
effects also apply to Federal Empowerment Zones that were adopted in the 1990s, and are considered in
a later section of this paper.
In summary, evaluation of tax incentives and other employment programs should include the number and
types of jobs created − export-based jobs, and full or part-time jobs −, the duration of the jobs, and the
workers who receive the jobs; that is, residents of the zone who were previously unemployed, for example.
Evaluations also should measure the wages for the new jobs, poverty reduction in the area, and housing
price capitalization or rent increases in the zone. Capitalization is of particular concern for programs that
target a small urban area because housing supply is more inelastic in a smaller area there than it is for an
entire region. Housing prices and rents are more apt to increase in EZ areas.

X-1. More Details on States’ Subsidies to Low-Income Areas of Cities
As various times, 40 states have adopted EZ policies. Tax reduction incentives for firms relocating or
expanding in the targeted area represent a common dimension of EZ programs, although the types of
taxes forgiven, and additional incentives provided vary considerably among states and programs. For
example, states and localities have reduced one or more taxes on inventories, property, corporate income
business income, or sales for businesses that locate or expand their employment in the zone. Existing
businesses may qualify for the tax benefits whether they expand their employment, depending on the
particular state program. In some cases, EZ programs include grants-in-aid to improve social conditions in
the targeted local area and/or make infrastructure improvements in the local area as well as the tax
incentives.
30

Bartik collected data on the structure of the tax incentives offered in 33 states and 45 industries.
Together, the 33 states comprise 92 percent of U.S. GDP, and the 45 industries in the 33 states comprise
91 percent of U.S. labor compensation. 42 His data do not only consider tax incentives for EZ programs.
Rather, the data describe several business incentives, including local government property tax
abatements, sales tax forgiveness on business inputs, tax credits against state businesses taxes for job
creation, state or local customized job training, state abatements for corporate income taxes, and research
and development tax credits.
Property taxes and sales taxes on business inputs account for 57 percent of state and local tax incentives
on business. However, property tax abatements and sales tax relief on business inputs and inventories do
not directly subsidize hiring more workers. Instead, the incentives promote firm expansion and
employment increases by increasing businesses’ profits. On the other hand, if part of the incidence of
property and sales taxes falls on capital, the incentives could reduce the cost of capital, and along with
encouraging business expansions, may encourage substitution of capital for labor. 43 Bartik further notes,
that since 1990, states have shifted qualifications for tax incentives more directly to reward job creation.
The following section reviews what we know about the effectiveness of state EZ programs, based on a
selection of often-cited studies. Early EZ programs aim to increase manufacturing jobs in the zone. Some
studies examine employment changes in the zone, while other studies get more granular and examine

Bartik, Timothy J. 2017. “A New Panel Database on Business Incentives for Economic Development Offered by state and
Local Governments in the United States.” Prepared for the Pew Charitable Trusts. http://research.upjohn.org/reports/225
43 Papke and others make this point. Papke, Leslie E. 1993. “What Do We Know about Enterprise Zones?” in Tax Policy and
the Economy. Volume 7 J.M. Poterba, Ed., NBER MIT Press: 37-72.
42
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employment changes among low-wage workers. Figure 2 contains a summary of each study that is
reviewed in more detail below.
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Figure 2
Selected Studies of Place Subsidies for Areas of Cities
Study/Authors

Enterprise Zone Incentives and Places Analyzed

Rubin and
Richards
(1992)

Examined results for zones in United Kingdom (UK) and
states in U.S.

Papke (1993)

Examines early evidence on enterprise zones in states.

Papke (1994)

Indiana EZ program grants relief from 100% of local
property tax on business inventories and an employment
tax credit for 10% of wages with max. credit of $1,500.

Boarnet and
Bogart (1996)

Tax credits against corporate income taxes if firm hires new
full-time employees. Also, reduced sales taxes and
reductions in unemployment insurance taxes.

Neumark and
Kolko (2010)

California EZ program provides tax credits for 50% of
qualified wages (defined as 150% of minimum wage) for
disadvantaged workers regardless of whether they live in
the enterprise zone area, income tax credit for sales and use
taxes on machinery purchases, accelerated depreciation,
and income tax credits for workers who live and work in the
zone.
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Results
UK zones not found to generate jobs.
Successful EZ program is states
characterized by: areas that have
potential for private development;
have a significant portion of industrial
and commercial activity; can support a
professionally managed and active
organization that establishes a publicprivate partnership.
Subsidies to capital induces
substitution of capital for labor.
Infrastructure deficiency or lack of
trained labor discourage location more
than a high cost of capital. Labor
subsidies create employment but do
not necessarily increase workers’
wages.
Inventories increase and
unemployment claims decrease in the
10 Indiana zones in the 1980s.
No effects on employment or property
values at the municipal level in
enterprise zones municipalities relative
to municipalities eligible for enterprise
zones but did not receive zone
designation.
Enterprise zones in CA do not increase
total employment in the enterprise
zone and reduces the total number of
businesses. May indicate that
businesses consolidate as number as
fewer business employ the same
number of employees. Study also finds
that the shares of jobs in low-wage
manufacturing industries do not
increase.

Selected Studies of place Subsidies for Areas of Cities (Continued)
Study/Authors

Federal Empowerment Zones

Ham, Swenson,
Imrohrorglu,
and Song
(2011)

Simultaneously estimates effects of incentives associated
with Enterprise Zones in CA, FL, MA, NY, OH, and OR
created in the 1990s, as well as Federal Empowerments
Zones and Enterprise Community Programs. State zone
benefits range from hiring incentives and state exemptions
from payroll taxes to property tax abatements.

Busso,
Gregory, and
Kline (2013)

Federal Empowerment Zones located in six large cities
subsidize the employment of workers who live and work
inside the zone. In addition to the wage subsidy for these
workers, zones also receive a substantial block grant for
business assistance infrastructure, training programs,
housing subsidies, and other physical developments. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development estimated
that the federal tax credits and block grants stimulated as
much as five times the their amounts in additional private
investment in the zones.

Hanson
(2009)

Examines employment, poverty and median property
values changes between 1990 and 2000 in census tracts
with empowerment zones.

Hanson and
Rohlin (2011)

Examines changes (between 1994 and 1996 and between
1994 and 2000) in shares of total city establishments and
in shares of total city employment in census tracts with
empowerment zones for each of seven industry categories,
using Dun and Bradstreet Data.

Source: Cited studies and author summaries.
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Results
Poverty and unemployment during the
1990s reduced in state enterprise
zones located in CA, MA, and NY.
Finds significant reduction in poverty
and unemployment and increased in
wages and salary income and
employment in Federal Empowerment
Zones and Enterprise Community
Programs.
From 1992 to 2000, empowerment
zone designation created jobs in zone
areas for zone and non-zone residents.
Earnings increased for local workers
and they found increases in housing
prices but not rents and not the cost of
living for zone residents. Results did
not reveal the relative importance of
the wage credits, block grants, and
private investment in jobs and earnings
growth.
Does not find empowerment ones
created jobs or reduced poverty in
empowerments zones. He finds that
median property values increased in
the zones, which he infers is indirect
evidence of increases in economic
activity in empowerment zones.
The wage tax credit increases
establishment and employment shares
in less capital-intensive industries –
retail sales and service industries and
decreases shares in transportation and
in finance, insurance and real estate
industries.

Selected Studies of Place Subsidies for Areas of Cities (Continued)
Study/Authors

Reynolds and
Rohlin (2015)

Federal Empowerment Zones

Results

Find increases in number of
households with incomes twice
Examines changes between 1990 and 2000 in
the poverty rate, but
the number of households in: nine separate
households with incomes of
income categories relative to the poverty line;
$100,000 or more drive almost
13 separate income categories; 16 separate
all of the increase. Also, find
housing gross rent and housing value categories
increases in density of
for 838 census blocks with empowerment zones households with incomes less
and 3,658 census blocks in enterprise
than ½ the poverty line. Find
communities (applied for and did not receive
increases in rents and housing
empowerment zone status). Uses empowerment values for high-cost housing in
zones’ blocks as experimental group and
empowerment zones. Overall,
enterprise communities’ blocks as a control
zone designation benefits
group.
higher income households, and
increases the number of
household in deep poverty.

Source: Cited studies and author summaries.

X-2. Evidence on Effectiveness of State Enterprise Zone Programs
Initial EZ programs focused on property tax relief, sales tax abatements, reductions in unemployment
insurance taxes, and accelerated depreciation on new equipment for state corporate income taxes. Papke
conducted an early study that analyzed employment and other economic effects of Indiana’s EZ program.
Indiana’s program at that time forgave property taxes on business inventories as well as provided
employers with a wage tax credits equal to 10 percent of wages up to a $1,500 maximum for each zone
resident hired. 44 Using a quasi-experimental design and panel data for local tax jurisdictions – not
enterprise zones per se – she compares employment and other outcomes for local tax jurisdictions that
contain zones with the same outcomes for similar local tax jurisdictions that do not contain zones.

Papke, Leslie E. 1994. “Tax Policy and Urban Development: Evidence from the Indiana Enterprise Zone Program.” Journal
of Public Economics. 54: 37-49.
44
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She finds that in local jurisdictions with zones, business inventories increased 8 percent, an expected result
because property tax abatement on business inventories represents the most generous aspect of the
enterprise zone tax incentive package. In addition, the value of machinery and equipment declined, while
local unemployment claims decreased. With the limitation on available data, the study could not establish
a direct link between employment of zone residents and wage tax credits, however.
Boarnet and Bogart also apply quasi-experimental methods, similar to Papke’s, to examine the EZ effects
for New Jersey’s program. 45 They examine employment and property value increases in New Jersey
municipalities that received EZs compared to those municipalities with areas that qualified as EZs but
were not designated as EZs.
In New Jersey, firms expanding in or relocating to the zone and hiring new full-time employees received
tax credits against the state corporate income tax, reductions in sales taxes on business purchases,
reductions in retail sales taxes, and reductions in unemployment insurance taxes. They find no
employment effects in municipalities with EZs compared to municipalities without zones, and no
difference in property values between municipalities with zones and municipalities without zones. Due to
data limitations, they also could not measure employment and property value effects for the EZ areas
themselves.
California has packaged a set of incentives for firms that locate or are located in specified zone areas and
hire disadvantaged workers regardless of their residences. Neumark and Kolko use a quasi-experimental
design and compare employment changes in zone areas with employment changes in similar areas that do

Boarnet, Marlon G. and William T Bogart. 1996. Enterprise Zones and Employment.” Journal of Urban Economics. 40(2):
198-215.
45
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not receive zone designations. 46,47 They use Dun and Bradstreet national longitudinal establishment files
and measure changes in employment within zones and in their control areas during the 1992-2004 period.
They also account in their analysis for federal programs, such as Enterprise Communities and
Empowerment Zones that overlap the EZ zone areas during their measurement period.
The most costly aspect of the California program is that it subsidizes establishments to hire
“disadvantaged workers” without regard to their residences. In addition, the program offers tax
reductions for business sales taxes, accelerated depreciation, longer carry forward periods for losses on
state corporate income taxes, and personal income tax credits to zone employees.
Their study does not find evidence that establishments increase employment in EZs. Because the subsidy
to low-wage workers combined with the machinery/equipment depreciation allowances favor
manufacturing establishments that hire low-wage workers, they also examine whether the share of lowerwage manufacturing industries increase in the zones. They find no evidence that the shares of lower-wage
manufacturing industries increase.
While Neumark and Kolko do not find evidence that the California EZ program increases employment of
low-wage workers or total employment in the zones, they are careful to state that their results only apply
to California, because zone programs in other states use different incentives. Nonetheless, as the results
for the above studies illustrate, the prevailing evidence is that tax incentives have not had measurable

Neumark, David and Jed Kolko. 2010. “Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California’s Enterprise Zone.”
Journal of Urban Economics. 68: 1-19.
47 They point out that previous studies suffer measurement error because, given available data, the studies could not use data
for the EZ itself. Instead, studies have used data that measure variables for local taxing districts, census tracts, and
municipalities to approximate EZs.
46
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effects on employment or poverty reduction in EZs. Perhaps because of the foregoing evidence, states
have deemphasized EZ tax subsidies in recent years in favor of other types of place subsidies.

X-3. Evidence on the Effectiveness of Federal Empowerment Zones
The federal government in 1993 through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
designated eight urban communities in eight different cities as Federal Empowerments Zones (FEZs) that
span on average 10 square miles in each city. Employers in each FEZ received (for up to ten years) a tax
credit of 20 percent on the first $15,000 of wages paid to each worker who both lives and works in the
zone. Employers in the zone also qualified for expanded expensing allowances for equipment purchases
applied to their federal corporate income taxes; favorable treatment on capital gains from investments;
and tax-exempt bond financing. In addition, six urban local governments with FEZs each received a $100
million block grant to fund one or more of business assistance, worker training, youth services, and/or
housing assistance. Three rural areas with zone designations received the same tax advantages as above
and $40 million in block grants. At the same time, the federal government designated Enterprise
Communities (ECs) – 49 cities that applied for but did not receive FEZ designation. ECs did not initially
receive tax credits but received tax-exempt bond financing and each local government received $2.95
million in block grants.
Busso, Gregory and Kline use quasi-experimental techniques like those used in EZ studies to examine the
employment, wage and housing price effects in FEZs compared to a control group of urban ECs. 48 Most
of the FEZs consist of contiguous groups of census tracts. Accordingly, Busso et al. use confidential

48 Busso, Matias, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Placed Based

Policy.” American Economic Review. 103(2): 897-947.
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microdata from the Decennial Census, the Standard Statistical Establishment List, and the Longitudinal
Business Database to construct a panel of employment, wages, and housing prices for households and
establishments in each of the relevant census tracts.
They find employment increases for FEZs relative to the control group. Further, larger firms (six or more
employees) in the FEZs have increased employment more than firms with five or fewer employees. Thus,
there are both a larger number of firms with six or more employees and a greater number of employees in
FEZs overall. Weekly wages increase for workers who both live and work in the FEZ, but not for workers
who work inside but reside outside the FEZ. They also find that housing values have increased in the zones
but that housing rents have not increased. In summary, their evidence suggests that FEZ residents find
jobs, have higher wages, and do not have higher rents that offset their wage gains.
One caveat, however, is that the research cannot identify whether the employment and wage changes are
due to tax incentives, wage subsidies, or block grants. The exact mechanisms that lead to employment
increases is subject to speculation; and leaves open the question of whether removing one element of the
program – the block grant, for example – would lead to similar employment, wage and housing price results.
Ham, Swenson, Imrohoroglu and Song have estimated effects of incentives associated with state EZs,
FEZs, and federal ECs on unemployment rates, poverty rates, the fraction of households with wage and
salary income, household average wage and salary income, and employment for residents of census tracts
in designated zones using data for the 1980, 1990 and 2000 periods. 49

Ham, John C. Charles Swenson, Ayse Imrohoroglu and Heonjae Song. 2011. “Government Programs Can Improve Local
Labor Markets: Evidence from State Enterprise Zone, Federal Empowerment Zones, and Federal Enterprise Community.”
Journal of Public Economics. 95: 779-797.
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Ham et al. find that places with EZs experienced increases in wages and salaries, reduced poverty, and
lowered unemployment on average for all the states and areas in their sample, although the strength of the
results are heterogeneous among states and areas. For example, FEZs have had larger effects in California
and Massachusetts for both of the estimators in their research, but in Florida, they find FEZ effects for
only one of the two estimators. In addition, one of the two estimators reveals reductions in poverty and
increases in the fractions of households with wage and salary income – not lower unemployment − for New
York, Ohio, and Oregon.
The subsidies to FEZs reduce unemployment and poverty in census tracts, increase wage and salary
income, as well as employment. ECs experience similar effects on unemployment and poverty reduction,
as well as increases in average wages and employment. Because ECs have smaller subsidies than FEZs, one
could speculate that the FEZ program could produce similar wage and employment outcomes with smaller
subsidies.
A caveat to the Ham et al. results is that census data record the employment of residents of a census tract
regardless of whether they work in the census tract, but employers in FEZs receive wage subsidies only
for workers who both live and work in the zone. Their use of data on residential employment may
introduce measurement error in the programs’ employment effects. In addition, the reduction in measured
poverty may result from movement of higher-wage jobs and people to the zones.
The next few papers offer contrary evidence on FEZ effectiveness. In three different papers, Hanson;
Hanson and Rohlin; and Reynolds and Rohlin examine the effects of FEZs on employment, housing prices
and rents among different income groups who live in the FEZ. 50 Hanson, using census tracts as

Hanson, Andrew. 2009. “Local Employment, Poverty, and Property Values effects of Geographically-Targeted Tax
Incentives: An Instrumental Variables Approach.” Regional Science and Urban Economics. 39:721-731. Hanson, Andrew and
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observations, finds that FEZ designations increase property values and have small employment and
poverty reduction effects. The property value effects are robust for different estimation methods and
those results suggest indirectly that economic activity has increased in FEZs, even though he does not find
significant employment increases nor poverty reduction for residents.
Hanson and Rohlin extend Hanson’s analysis using Dun and Bradstreet establishment data. They reason
that the wage tax credit benefits lower-wage, labor-intensive establishments more than less laborintensive establishments. (The establishment data use place of work rather than place of residence to
measure employment.) Their results confirm that FEZ designations alter the industry mix in the zone. That
is, the shares of city employment in FEZs increase in the labor-intensive retail and service sectors, but they
decrease in less labor-intensive transportation and finance, insurance and real estate sectors. Because
employment increase in some industries and decreases in others, these findings may help explain the
conflicting results among studies about whether FEZ policies increase total employment in the FEZ.
In a third paper, Reynolds and Rohlin use census block data to examine which households in the income
distribution gain from FEZs. They find that within FEZs the density of households whose incomes are
below poverty increases; the density of households whose incomes exceed twice the poverty rate
increases; and the density of households with incomes above $100,000 (in year 2000 dollars) increases.
Moreover, the increase in the number of households with incomes above $100,000 explains almost all of
increase in the density of households with incomes above twice the poverty level.

Shawn Rohlin. 2011. “The Effect of Location-Based Tax Incentives on Establishment Location and Employment across
Industry Sectors.” Public Finance Review. 39(2): 195-225. Reynolds, C. Lockwood and Shawn Reynolds. 2015. “The Effects
of Location-Based Tax Policies on the Distribution of Household Income: Evidence from the Federal Empowerment Zone
Program.” Journal of Urban Economics. 88: 1-15.
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They also find that housing values increase in FEZ areas that initially have higher housing values, and gross
rents experience small increases in these same areas. The increase in housing values is consistent with
higher demand for owner-occupied housing among higher-income residents and the jobs created for that
group. Little or no increase in rental housing prices is consistent with little or no increase in demand for
rental housing among lower-paid residents and workers for whom their evidence suggests FEZs do not
help.
To summarize the results of the above five papers, the evidence on the effectiveness of FEZs is mixed. The
disaggregate results from the Reynolds and Rohlin paper offer a more fine-grained interpretation of FEZ
policy effectiveness. To the extent that FEZs or similar programs alter the economic landscape of areas,
the program benefits may bypass lower-income residents and improve prospects for gentrification of the
area. One could use the findings in the last three papers to speculate that increases in retail and service
establishments make the FEZs more attractive to higher income households who then move into the areas.

X-4. Discussion of Tax Incentive Programs
The literature reviewed here suggests that reducing taxes or eliminating them altogether has not proven
an effective means to turn around regional economies or even smaller distressed areas that lie within
otherwise economically thriving metropolitan areas. Programs that feature wage subsidies in the form of
tax credits to employers have higher probabilities for job creation, but studies do not uniformly find them
effective.
Using a relatively optimistic assumption of 1.5 for an elasticity of job growth with respect to wage
reductions from subsidies and a job growth multiplier of 2.0, substantial wage subsidies can produce cost
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effective job growth. 51 However, Bartik suggests that, when manufacturing jobs are created in distressed
zones, in-migrants to the zones receive 85 percent or more of the jobs created, or few extant residents of
the zones get the jobs.
Bartik makes another point about wage subsidies. He notes that the methods of financing the wage
subsidies can have a variety of secondary effects, such as reduced school spending or a range of other
program cuts as well as opportunity costs if tax increases finance the subsidies. The net effects of wage
subsidies may be even smaller once benefits forgone due to expenditure cuts or tax increases are
considered.

XI.

Job Training

Job training programs offer another path to employment for disadvantaged workers and to reemployment
for displaced workers. Program effects and their effectiveness can be measured in a number of ways, such
as, outcomes that include employment or finding a job, the employment duration, and the earnings in the
new positions compared to earnings in the previous employment. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith review
both the empirical methodologies used in studies of publicly funded job programs and report their
effectiveness. The programs they analyze include formal classroom training, wage and employment
subsidies, subsidized and non-subsidized employer-provided training, and job search assistance. 52 It
should be mentioned that non-subsidized (by government) employer-provided training typically has more

Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical
Report No.18-035. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Pp. 13-14.
https://doi.org/10.17848/tr18-035
52 Heckman, James J. Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith 1999. “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market
Programs.” In Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics. Volume 3a. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Pp
1865-2097.
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spending associated with it than publicly funded training programs. Researchers, however, typically do
not have access to data to evaluate employer-provided job training.
Their review reports findings from studies that use experimental and non-experimental methods to
measure training programs’ effectiveness. The empirical results on the effects of job training on
employment and other variables differ across studies and even differ across studies that analyze the same
job programs. Heckman et al. attribute the variation in results both to different degrees of selection bias
for those opting into an experiment and to model misspecification.
Moreover, because of data limitations, researchers generally cannot measure a key dimension of publicly
funded job training effectiveness; namely, increases in workers’ hourly wages directly attributable to
training programs. Consequently, earnings (not hourly wages) and employment represent the most
common outcome measure for U.S. programs. Many studies also report findings on a variety of non-labor
market outcomes, such as, the utilization of social assistance programs, more educational attainment, less
criminality, and less teenage pregnancy.
Lack of data also limits the calculation of the net social benefits of public training programs. For example,
while training costs are generally available, other costs associated with training, including the value of
training participant’s leisure time, their forgone earnings, the deadweight loss from taxation to finance
training programs, and the displacement effects if newly trained workers replace other workers, are not
generally considered. 53 (See Heckman et al. p. 2043-44.) Heckman et al. also note that the cost of public
training programs typically amounts to $1,000 per trainee (in 1999 dollars). Even with a return as high as
10 percent on the training investment, participants might realize $100 increases in their earnings. Where

For a discussion of displacement effects, see Davidson, Carl and Stephen Woodbury. 1993. “The Displacement Effect of
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researchers find positive effects from training programs, participants’ earnings increase commensurate
with a 10 percent return on the investment in training. One conclusion is that if the objective of U.S. policy
is to increase participants’ earnings significantly, it needs to increase the amount it invests in training
programs.
Heckman et al. summarize the empirical results from job training studies. After job training, earnings of
women increase more than earnings of men, and adult workers gain more from training compared to
younger, less-experienced workers. Low-skilled populations do not benefit from classroom training or
from on-the-job training. Wage subsidies to employers improve employment and earnings of low-skilled
workers. 54
Card, Kluve and Weber have updated the Heckman et al. review of active labor market policies in the
United States and in 46 other countries. A few countries operate most of the training programs; six
countries among the 46 have 2/3s of the training programs. Germany alone has 30 percent of the
programs.55 Active labor market policies include training, job search assistance, subsidized employment,
public sector employment and a variety of other programs. Together, training, job search assistance, and
subsidized employment account for over 75 percent of active labor market programs among the 46
countries.
Their cross-country meta-analysis of training programs’ effectiveness reveals that, on average, active
labor market programs have small to no effects in the short-run; the effects become more positive in the

Heckman et al. note that the U.S. spending as a percentage of GDP on publicly funded training programs ranks last among
the OECD countries they examine.
55 Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber. 2015. “What Works? A Meta-Analysis of Recent Active Labor Market
Program Evaluations.” NBER Working Paper Series. Working Paper 21431. Card, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber.
2010. “Active Labor Market Program Policy Evaluations.” The Economic Journal. 120 548: F452-F477.
54

45

medium term (2 to 3 years); and get stronger in the longer run. Programs that build human capital have
larger long-run effects on earnings and employment than job search and other programs.
Program effectiveness varies by workers’ sex, age, employment experience, and skill levels. The effects of
training programs are larger for females than for males and higher for long-term unemployed
(experienced) workers. Programs have no, or even negative, effects on employment for young workers
and for older workers. Low-skill or disadvantaged workers benefit most from job search assistance. All
active labor market policies have larger effects during recessions.
Their conclusions are similar to those that Heckman et al. draw for the U.S. The magnitudes of the effects
of training programs on increased earnings is proportional to the amount that different countries invest
per training program participant. In addition, matching an active-labor-market training policy to a
particular type of worker – females, disadvantaged, and longer-term unemployed workers – enhances
program benefits and their effectiveness.
Bartik and others point to customized job training to help local economies reemploy displaced workers.
Community colleges work with local employers to develop customized education programs that train a
workforce for specific jobs in local industries. The results from the job training literature suggest that
customized training programs are most helpful for workers with experience or motivated younger
workers, but probably not as useful to employ or increase the earnings of disadvantaged workers. 56 Job
search assistance – helping them to find jobs – and wage subsidies seem to be the most effective programs
for disadvantaged workers.

Bartik, Timothy J. 2018. “What Works to Help Manufacturing-Intensive Local Economies?” Upjohn Institute Technical
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The Project Quest in San Antonio, Texas appears to have had success with training and job placement for
disadvantaged workers. The program places trainees in community colleges where they learn skills needed
for jobs in high demand – health care and nursing, information technology and other jobs in high demand in
the San Antonio region. The program also spends on average $11,000 per trainee (substantially more
than typical), as well as pays half the tuition and provides help with housing rents and utilities where
needed. 57 The success of Project Quest reinforces Heckman’s message noted above. Effective job
training programs may require considerably more spending per participant than typical in publicly funded
job training programs.

XII.

Improving Earnings and Employment for Low-Income Populations

The skewed distribution of job growth into lower pay and higher pay jobs is likely to continue to reduce
the percentage of jobs classified as middle wage. Workers displaced by technology have requested job
training, advance notice of technological implementation by employers, and severance packages to
mitigate displacement effects from technology. 58 Enhanced job training programs along the lines that
Bartik has recommended are needed for this group of workers. Job search programs can place
disadvantaged workers in jobs where they may earn minimum or slightly above minimum wages.
Preparing future workers for employment appears to require more than job training programs in
adulthood. A growing amount of research suggests that early intervention for children needs greater
policy priority.

Schwartz Nelson D. “Job Training Is a New Shot At Prosperity for Texans.” New York Times. August 20, 2019, B1 and B4.
And https://questsa.org/
58 Frey, Carl Benedikt. 2019. “The High Cost of Impeding Automation.” Wall Street Journal Report: Technology. October 25.
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Mounting evidence (Moving to Opportunity) supports the tenant that growing up in better
neighborhoods enhances a child’s income and social mobility, as measured by their earnings and an array
of social behaviors. 59 Chetty and his coauthors have explored income and social mobility using different
datasets and their work corroborates the evidence in the Moving to Opportunity experiment. 60 The
studies emphasize that the earlier a child is exposed to better neighborhoods, schools, and social
frameworks the greater the income mobility and social outcomes. Put another way, moving children as
teens, even early teens, can lead to no effect or even negative effects on income and social mobility.
On the other hand, it is not practical to move millions of children and their families to neighborhoods that
afford them better opportunities. Chetty notes that we need to improve opportunities in current
neighborhoods. Katz and Krueger propose a few policies that likely would increase economic mobility
among those in the lower portion of the income distribution. Among the suggestions is universal preschool
to help restore increasing educational attainment in successive generations, which they note has lagged
since the 1980s. 61
Based on extensive empirical research, James Heckman has advocated preschool programs for children
from disadvantaged backgrounds. In a portion of his work, he has shown that programs such as head start
and the Perry preschool program (discussed below) may increase cognitive test scores, and preschool
programs have measurable effects on non-cognitive abilities, such as perseverance, self-control,

Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren and Lawrence Katz. 2016. “The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children:
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industriousness, sociability, time preference, and leadership – abilities and skills that employers value in
their workers. For example, Heckman et al. find that non-cognitive skills have large and statistically
significant effects on hourly wages of both males and females at all levels of education, ranging from high
school dropout through four-year college degree. 62 Non-cognitive abilities and skills also explain a range
of improved social behaviors.
Stewart’s recent evidence suggests that better non-cognitive (soft) skills also increases median wages in
STEM and non-STEM occupations. Specifically, median wages are highest for workers with both highSTEM skills and high soft skills, while workers with low-STEM skills but high soft skills have the second
highest median wages. Workers in occupations that require high-STEM and low soft skills rank third
highest in median wages, and those workers in occupations that require neither STEM nor soft skills have
the lowest median wages. 63

XII-1. More on PreSchool
The Perry preschool project used a social experiment to measure the effects of preschool enrollment on
the future incomes of disadvantaged children. The experiment ran for five successive years from 1962 to
1967 in Ypsilanti, Michigan. 64 The treated group, followed until age 39, is more likely to graduate from
high school, has higher employment rates and earnings, has lower rates of arrest, measures better on other
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social behaviors, as well as uses public assistance programs at a lower rate than the control (nonpreschool) group.
Heckman and Karapakula have recently used refined statistical techniques on the Perry data to adjust
better for randomization protocols needed for the small sample sizes in the Perry experiment. In addition,
they tracked the experimental and control participants to the age of 55, and they find that the effects of
preschool persist past age 39, and the treated group has better health, higher employment rates, better
cognitive and non-cognitive skills, as well as better outcomes in the social areas mentioned above. The
treatment effects are particularly strong for males. They conclude, “Improvements in childhood home
environments and parental attachment appear to be an important source of the long-term benefits of the
program.”65
In a subsequent paper, Heckman and Karapakula measure whether there are external effects of the Perry
preschool program on the siblings and progeny of the original Perry preschoolers. 66 They find that the
children of the original Perry preschoolers also have lower crime rates, higher education levels and higher
employment rates compared to the children of the control group. The effects are especially pronounced
among male progeny. They are careful to sort out confounding effects, such as the treated group living in
better neighborhoods than the untreated group. In fact, the neighborhoods, using standard measure of
social environments, of the treated group are no better than and sometimes worse than the neighborhoods
of the untreated group. Preschool then, and not neighborhood effects, explain the observed positive
outcomes for children of the treated group.

65 Heckman, James J. and Ganesh Karapakula.
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They also find substantial positive effects on the siblings of the Perry participants, even though the siblings
did not participate in the preschool. Again, the effects are larger and more notable for male siblings.

XIII.

Summary and Conclusions

Significant areas of the United States have lagged economically behind economies on either coast of the
U.S., particularly the eastern heartland – a region east of Mississippi River and west of the east coast.
Middle wage job losses in manufacturing industries have reduced well-being among a significant number
of workers, especially workers in the eastern heartland. 67 Labor migration from trailing to growing regions
has in the past served to address job losses in certain regions. The evidence from several studies shows
that migration of low- and middle-wage workers has slowed considerably, because moving to growing
areas often leaves these migrants worse off, as the cost of housing in growth areas offsets the wage gains
they might realize in growth areas. The slowdown in migration leaves many in declining regions where
factories continue to close or relocate; globalization has already affected jobs; and technology appears to
threaten more jobs. The combination of migration slowdown and job losses in regions leads policymakers
and researchers to think about subsidies to individuals tied to places and circumstances. 68
An extensive literature advocates customized job training - community colleges and employers
cooperating to train workers for jobs that employers need - to retrain displaced workers for employment
in new fields and with new employers. By contrast, disadvantaged workers gain employment more
through job search assistance and wage subsidies paid to employers than through training programs.

Austin, Benjamin, Edward Glaeser, and Lawrence H. Summers. 2018. “Saving the Heartland: Place-Based Policies in 21st
Century America.” Brookings Papers on Economics Activity. Spring pp. 151-255. See page 157.
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In efforts to attract employers and jobs to inner-city areas, state and cities have relied on tax reductions in
enterprise zone areas. Based on many studies, those programs appear to have limited success. To the
extent that they attract new employers or encourage expansion of existing businesses, the employers tend
to hire workers who live outside the targeted area. These programs may in the end increase the economic
rents of employers, and only marginally increase employment among disadvantaged or even among more
educated, better-trained workers.
Federal Empowerment Zones offer, among other things, wage subsidies to employers who hire workers
who both live and work in the empowerment zone. Busso et al. conclude that wage subsidies increase
employment among workers who both reside and work in Federal Empowerment Zones, and Neumark
encourages wage subsidies based on the residence of the individual. 69 Other studies find that the Federal
Empowerment Zones have had more limited effectiveness.
To have meaningful effects on employment for disadvantaged workers, Phelps has suggested wage
subsidies of up to 75 percent of employers’ cost for an unlimited amount of time for the lowest paid
workers; the subsidy would phase out as wages increase, however. 70 The size of the subsidy needed to
expand the number employed will also depend on worker productivity, the types of jobs available, and the
elasticity of demand for labor, among other factors. There are concerns about stigmatization for workers

69 Busso, Matias, Jesse Gregory, and Patrick Kline. 2013. “Assessing the Incidence and Efficiency of a Prominent Placed Based

Policy.” American Economic Review. 103(2): 897-947. Neumark, David. 2018. “Rebuilding Community Job Subsidies.” In Jay
Shambaugh and Ryan Nunn (editors) Place-Based Policies for Shared Economic Growth. Washington, D.C. Brookings Press
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and Proceedings. 84(2): 54-58. See also, Phelps, Edmund S. 1997. Rewarding Work. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press. And Phelps, Edmund S. 2001. “Subsidize Wages.” In Philippe Van Parijs et al. (editors) What’s Wrong with a Free Lunch?
Boston, MA: Beacon Press pp. 51-59.
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with wage subsides, and employers would need to exercise discretion with information about the
employees for whom the employer receives subsidies. 71
Moving to Opportunity and ensuing work of Chetty et al. has shown that children growing up in
neighborhoods with improved social environments leads to higher chances of income and social mobility
in their adult lives. However impractical it is to move children to better neighborhoods, it is possible to
improve the social environments of their own neighborhoods. Addressing child poverty is known to
benefit children later in life. 72 Another valuable approach for children would place them in high-quality
preschools, which have shown promise for development of their non-cognitive skills and cognitive skills.
Evidence suggests preschool leads to more economic mobility and to better life outcomes that endure
across generations. Programs, such as high-quality preschool, may increase national income.
In addition to job training and preschool, Austin, Glaeser and Summers discuss the potential for
differentially higher in-kind and earned-income-tax-credit (EITC) subsidies for households stuck in
lagging economic regions. 73 Others have noted, that in real dollars, the same nominal EITC has more value
in lagging regions that typically have lower costs of living. A basic income allowance for households in
lagging regions also has merit, although that and the other enhanced subsidies to household in these
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Blank. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Pp 262-94.
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regions may introduce undesirable economic incentives and can be fraught with administrative and legal
complexities. 74

Paying a basic income to disadvantaged populations in particular lagging regions may cause migration of people to those
regions. Length of residency qualifications can be imposed on programs, but in some cases, these are challenged on
constitutional (equal protection) grounds. See Van Parijs, Phillippe and Yannick Vanderborght. 2017. Basic Income: A Radical
Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane Economy. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. See paperback edition 2019,
Chapter 6 pages 133-145.
74
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